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LOUIS DEL DUCA AND NANCY A. WELSH*
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Agreements and
Awards: Application of the New York Convention
in the United States**t
Topic I. C
International commercial arbitration provides customized and ef-
ficient resolution for disputes arising out of transnational commerce.
When arbitration occurs in states that have ratified the New York
Convention, the process also offers enforceable outcomes even in states
other than the one where the arbitration occurred. The United States
ratified the New York Convention in 1970, and its courts overwhelm-
ingly enforce both arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. There
are exceptions, however, and American courts require the use of cer-
tain procedures.
This Article provides a brief survey of American courts' recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign arbitration agreements and arbitral
awards. It begins by examining the extent of the reciprocity and com-
mercial reservations made by the United States and the circumstances
under which the Panama Convention preempts the New York Conven-
tion. Turning to the enforcement of arbitration agreements and
clauses, the Article examines American courts' interpretations of the
Convention's requirement of a signed agreement in writing and the
circumstances that can make an arbitration agreement "null and
void" or "incapable of being performed." The Article also summarizes
courts' treatment of claims of waiver and lack of knowledge regarding
the existence of arbitration clauses. Regarding American courts' en-
forcement of arbitral awards, the Article addresses the following
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defenses explicitly provided by the Convention: inability to present the
case, lack of proper notice, lack of binding effect upon the parties, and
violation of public policy. The Article also considers other defenses
that arise out of application of the U.S. Constitution and federal rules
of procedure: lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.
Finally, the Article distinguishes the circumstances that permit each
of the following judicial dispositions: vacatur of arbitral award, en-
forcement or refusal to enforce arbitral award, and adjournment or
stay of arbitral award.
I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. Incorporation by Reference into the Federal Arbitration Act
The New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereafter "The New York Convention" or
"The Convention") is a multilateral treaty that imposes dual enforce-
ment obligations on the courts of contracting states. Specifically,
these courts must enforce arbitration agreements involving interna-
tional commerce and recognize and enforce arbitral awards made in
other contracting states.'
The New York Convention resulted from an international confer-
ence convened in 1958 by the United Nations Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC). The United States delegation to the conference
recommended that the United States not become a signatory to the
New York Convention due to concerns that it would require substan-
tial changes in state, and potentially even federal, court procedures.
The United States' position changed as transnational commerce,
transnational disputing and court costs increased. In 1970, the
United States chose to ratify the treaty.
Congress implemented the Convention through incorporation by
reference in Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (hereafter
FAA), which provides: "The Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be
enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter."2
Chapter 2 also provides that the general provisions of Chapter 1
of the FAA apply to actions and proceedings brought under Chapter
2, but only "to the extent that chapter [Chapter 1] is not in conflict
with this chapter [Chapter 2] or the Convention as ratified by the
United States."3
1. New York Convention, Art. I (1), Jun. 7, 1959, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter
New York Convention].
2. 9 U.S.C. §201 (2012).
3. 9 U.S.C. §208 (2012).
[Vol. 62
2014] ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 71
B. Dual Obligation of U.S. Courts to Recognize and Enforce
Arbitration Agreements and Arbitral Awards
As noted supra, Articles I and II of the Convention, as incorpo-
rated by the FAA, impose dual enforcement obligations upon the
courts of the United States. In Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd.,4 The
court described the procedures that parties must use to invoke these
dual obligations:
To implement the Convention, Chapter 2 of the FAA pro-
vides two causes of action ... for a party seeking to enforce
arbitration agreements covered by the Convention: (1) an ac-
tion to compel arbitration in accord with the terms of the
agreement, 9 U.S.C. § 206, and (2) at a later stage, an action
to confirm an arbitral award made pursuant to an arbitra-
tion agreement, 9 U.S.C. § 207.5
It is noteworthy that the FAA imposes a three-year statute of
limitations upon actions to confirm arbitral awards.6
C. Foreign, Non-Domestic and Domestic Arbitral Awards
The New York Convention is applicable to two types of awards:
"foreign" and "non-domestic" awards.7 Foreign awards are those in
which the arbitration was conducted in a seat outside United States
territory. Even if the seat of the arbitration was within the United
States, however, the FAA provides for the enforcement of an award
that "involves property located abroad, envisages performance or en-
forcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or
more foreign states."8 Courts have interpreted the FAA to find that
such awards are "non-domestic" and also governed by the Conven-
tion, even when one or both of the parties to the arbitration is
domestic. 9
4. Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing to Cza-
rina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2004)).
5. Id. at 1262-1263.
6. 9 U.S.C. §207 (2012); see Verve Communications Pvt. Ltd. V. Software Intern.,
Inc., No. 11-1280 2011 WL 5508636 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2011).
7. New York Convention, supra note 1 at Article 1 ("This Convention shall apply
to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State
other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are
sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It
shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State
where their recognition and enforcement are sought.")
8. 9 U.S.C. §202 (2012).
9. See e.g., Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte v. Industrial
Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d 1434, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998) (joining First, Second, Seventh
and Ninth Circuits in holding that arbitration agreements and awards involving a
non-domestic party are "non-domestic" even if the arbitration was conducted in the
United States).
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D. Reservations Made by the United States
Article I of the Convention provides that it "shall apply to the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory
of the state other than the state where the recognition and enforce-
ment of such awards are sought [.]" Article I (3), however, provides
for limitations upon this broad grant of authority by allowing ratify-
ing states to make "reciprocity" and "commercial" reservations.
Specifically, a ratifying state may: ". . . on the basis of reciprocity
declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and en-
forcement of awards made only in the territory of another contracting
State" 10 and, ". .. also declare that it will apply the Convention only
to differences .... which are considered commercial under the na-
tional law of the state making such declaration."" The United States
has adopted both of these reservations.
E. Reciprocity Reservation
United States courts use the location of an arbitration to deter-
mine whether they must enforce the award.' 2 Even if both parties are
from non-contracting states, the award will be enforced within the
United States as long as the arbitration was conducted in a con-
tracting state. On the other hand, if both parties are from contracting
states but the arbitration occurred in a non-contracting state, the
courts in the United States will not enforce the award.' 3
F. Commercial Reservation
The commercial reservation allows ratifying states to limit en-
forcement of arbitral awards to cases involving legal relationships
that are commercial. If an arbitral dispute arises out of any other
relationship, then courts in states that have taken the reservation
cannot grant enforcement of the award.
Courts in the United States have found that a relationship quali-
fies as commercial as long as it is "related to" commerce.' 4 Two
companies' exchange of goods for payment represents a classic exam-
10. New York Convention, supra note 1 at Article 1(3).
11. New York Convention, supra note 1 at Article 11(2).
12. La Societe Nationale Pour La Recherche v. Shaheen Natural Res. Co., 585 F.
Supp 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); See also E.A.S.T., Inc. of Stamford v. MIV Alaia, 876 F.2d
1168 (5th Cir. 1989).
13. Jugometal v. Samincorp, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (court enforced
an arbitration award decided in France (a member country) between a Yugoslavian
party (non-member state) and a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Panamanian company);
see also Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., 107 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. Ill. 1997) (finding that be-
cause performance was to occur internationally, Convention also governed
enforcement of arbitral award made in the U.S. and involving parties based in the
U.S.).
14. Trans Chem. Ltd. v. China Nat'l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266
(S.D. Tex. 1997).
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ple of a commercial transaction and therefore fits squarely within the
bounds of the New York Convention.' 5 In Henry v. Murphy,16 how-
ever, there was neither a formal agreement nor a contract.
17
Nonetheless, the broad language of the Convention (". . . legal rela-
tionships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as
commercial.. .") allowed the court to consider a dispute arising out of
the sale of stock to come within the terms of the New York Conven-
tion.' In some instances, even an employer-employee relationship
involving a limited fiduciary duty will be considered "commercial in
nature," and thus come within the bounds of the Convention.' 9 For
example, courts now consider seamen's employment contracts com-
mercial relationships under Chapter 1 of the FAA.20 In Francisco v.
MIT Stolt Achievement, the court found that even if a plaintiff-em-
ployee's claim lacks a tie to commerce as required by a strict
interpretation of the language of the New York Convention, the
plaintiff is nonetheless obligated to arbitrate his claim pursuant to an
agreement in his employment contract.2 '
At this point, it does not appear that United States courts have
identified any types of cases as not arbitrable under the Convention
due to the limitations imposed by the commercial reservation. 2 2
15. Siderius, Inc. v. Compania de Acero Del Pacifico, S. A., 453 F. Supp. 22, 24
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
15. See also Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 528 F. Supp. 243, 245 (D.P.R. 1981) ("The
complaint shows on its face that it involves a transaction involving foreign commerce.
The dispute, as the one in Siderius v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, 453 F. Supp. 22
(S.D.N.Y., 1978), arose out of classical commercial relationship, one involving the
purchase and sale of goods by two corporations.").
16. Henry v. Murphy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2002).
17. Id.
18. Henry v. Murphy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2002), affd,
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 23199 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 2002).
19. Faberge Int'l Inc. v. Di Pino, No. 23387N,1985 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 45265
(N.Y. App. Div. July 2, 1985).
20. Amizola v. Dolphin Shipowner, S.A., 354 F. Supp. 2d 689 (E.D. La 2004.);
Bautista v. Star Cruises, 286 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2003), affd, 396 F.3d 1289
(11th Cir. 2005); Robbins v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd, CV 07-6088 GAF CTX, 2007
WL 4801296 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2007).
21. Francisco v. M/T Stolt Achievement, No. 00-3532 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3902
(E.D. La. Mar. 23, 2001) affd, 293 F.3d 270, 273-75 (5th Cir. 2002).
22. But see Arthur J. Gemmell, Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle
East, 5 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 169, 187 (2006) (asserting that matters of family or
inheritance law would come within the commercial reservation and that this would be
"especially important to Middle Eastern Islamic states, where such matters are re-
served exclusively to domestic jurisdiction").
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II. THE PANAMA CONVENTION-AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF
ENFORCING AN ARBITRAL AWARD
The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration 23 (herein Panama Convention) was signed in Panama in
1975 at a special conference of the Organization of American States
(herein OAS) on private international law.24 Adopted by the United
States and enacted through Chapter 3 of the FAA,25 the Convention
has seventeen signatory nations located throughout the Americas. 26
Unless the parties expressly agree otherwise, if a majority of the
parties involved in an arbitration are citizens of Panama Convention
ratifying or acceding states and these states also are OAS members,
the Panama Convention will apply and, indeed, preempts the New
York Convention. In all other international commercial arbitration
matters, the New York Convention will apply. 27
III. OBJECTIONS AND DEFENSES TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Parties may raise both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional ob-
jections to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement or clause.
A. Challenges to the Jurisdiction of the Arbitrators
The doctrine of competence-competence is the general under-
standing by international courts that arbitrators have the authority
to examine their own jurisdiction without prior court approval to do
so. 28 In the United States, however, there is a presumption that a
court will determine whether an arbitrator has jurisdiction to decide
23. The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,
Jan. 30, 1975, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter Panama Convention] available at http:/
/www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-35.html.
24. Found at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-35.html.
25. 9 U.S.C. §301-307 (2012).
26. Currently, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United
States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela are signatory nations. Of OAS member-
states, only the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua have not signed the Panama Con-
vention. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration, (providing a list of signatories) available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-35.html.
27. See 9 U.S.C. §305 (2012) ("When the requirements for application of both the
Inter-American Convention and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, are met, determination as to which Con-
vention applies shall, unless otherwise expressly agreed, be made as follows: (1) If a
majority of the parties to the arbitration agreement are citizens of a State or States
that have ratified or acceded to the Inter-American Convention and are member
States of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Convention shall
apply. (2) In all other cases the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall apply.").
28. MARGARET MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION, 91 (2008).
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a controversy. 29 There is a further presumption in favor of finding
that the arbitrator has such jurisdiction. 30 Once the court finds that
the arbitrator possesses jurisdiction and enforces the arbitration
clause, the arbitrator or arbitral panel will decide substantive issues
regarding the underlying contract and allegations of waiver, delay in
bringing arbitration, and other similar contentions.3 1
B. Severability of Arbitration Clause
The Supreme Court in Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardigna 32 de-
termined that there are two main classes of challenges to a contract
containing an arbitration agreement:3 3 a challenge to the arbitration
agreement itself and a challenge to the contract as a whole.
Under the FAA, arbitration clauses or agreements are "severa-
ble" from the contract as a whole.3 4 As a result, even if one of the
parties challenges the legality of the overall contract, a court may
nonetheless find the arbitration agreement enforceable. Questions re-
garding the substance of the underlying contract will then be within
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
This "severability doctrine" has the practical effect of limiting the
scope of a court's initial examination to the arbitration agreement it-
self. Even in instances in which there are allegations of fraud in the
inducement of the contract, a court generally will not examine the
substance of the controversy unless there is an allegation of fraud in
the inducement of the arbitration clause. 35 Also, United States courts
will decline to decide if an arbitration agreement is invalid unless the
arbitration clause is specifically challenged by a party.3 6 Only in di-
rect challenges of the arbitration agreement will a United States
court remove the controversy from the arbitrator's discretion.
C. Requirement of Signed Agreement in Writing
In order to win enforcement of an arbitration agreement pursu-
ant to the New York Convention, the requirements of the Convention
must be met.3 7 One such requirement is the "agreement in writing"
provision of Article 11 (2) of the Convention: "The term 'agreement in
writing' shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitra-
29. First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 946 (1995).
30. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
31. Id.
32. Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardigna, 546 U.S.440 (2006).
33. Id. at 444-45.
34. Id. at 445.
35. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-404 (1967).
36. Advance Am. Servicing of Arkansas, Inc. v. McGinnis, 375 Ark. 24, 38 (Ark.
2008).
37. This can be understood as simply a matter of meeting statutory requirements,
or as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.
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tion agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of
letters or telegrams."38
In applying the requirement of a signed agreement in writing,
American courts must sometimes determine the ability of signatories
to bind non-signatories. This determination, in turn, can require
choice of law analysis. In InterGen N.V. v. Grina,39 the court held
that an arbitration agreement was unenforceable against the parties
because they were distinct corporate entities and had not signed the
agreement. 40 More recently, however, an American court held that
an arbitration agreement might be enforceable against a corporate
non-signatory, depending upon the application of English law to the
issue of piercing the corporate veil. 4 1 The signatories had specified
English law in their choice of law provision in the agreement. In Iran
Ministry of Defense of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc.,4 2 the
Ninth Circuit also found that a federal district court had jurisdiction
to enforce an arbitration award in favor of Iran against an American
corporation even though there was no written arbitration agreement
between the parties. The court found that the Convention's require-
ment of a signed written agreement was met by the execution of the
Algiers Accord on behalf of private claimants and Iran.
There is a split among the federal circuit courts on whether a
contract containing an arbitration clause-in contrast to a separate
arbitration agreement-must be signed by the parties in order to
make the agreement to arbitrate enforceable under the Convention.
(The Supreme Court has declined to grant certiorari on this point."43 )
Jurisdictions typically use one of three approaches to handle the sig-
nature requirement. Courts using the first approach always require
the signatures of the parties regardless of whether the case involves
an arbitration clause contained in a primary contract or a separate
38. Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir. 2003). (citing Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n. 15 (1974)); New York Convention, supra note
1 at Article 11(2).
39. Id.
40. The signatories in the InterGen case were corporations related to the parties,
but were distinct entities. Without the signatures of the distinct entities who were
parties to the dispute, the arbitration agreement was not enforceable by the parties.
See id. at 150.
41. See FR 8 Singapore Pte. Ltd. V. Albacore Maritime Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 628
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
42. Iran Ministry of Def. of Islamic Rep. of Iran v. Gould Inc., 887 F.2d 1357 (9th
Cir. 1989).
43. See Nielson v. Seaboard Corp., 129 S. Ct. 624 (2008), cert. denied; Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Nielson v. Seaboard Corp., 08-65 2008 WL 2773349 at i (July 14,
2008) (stating the question presented was "the proper scope and application of article
11(2) of the Convention, relating to when an arbitration clause must be 'signed by the
parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams').
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arbitration agreement. 44 The second approach requires the signa-
tures of the parties only when there is a separate arbitration
agreement. 45 This approach obligates a party who never signed the
primary contract containing an arbitration clause to arbitrate, re-
gardless of whether the primary contract has been found enforceable.
Courts using the third approach explicitly reconcile the Convention's
"signed by the parties" writing requirement with the FAA's require-
ment of only a "written provision" in the contract or arbitration
"agreement in writing."4 6 As noted supra, Chapter 2 of the FAA in-
corporates the Convention by reference, and then specifies that the
"domestic arbitration" rules of Chapter 1 also apply unless they are
in conflict with the provisions of Chapter 2. The FAA's deference to
the Convention indicates that Article 11(2) of the Convention will con-
trol regarding the signature requirement.
UNCITRAL has recommended that states adopt Article 7 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as
revised, which specifically recognizes that the writing requirement
for arbitration agreements may be met by electronic communications
including, but not limited to, electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy. 47 At least one court in the United States has already found
that a two-way exchange of emails meets the Convention's writing
requirement. 48
D. Defense that the Agreement is Null and Void, Inoperative or
Incapable of Being Performed
Article 11(3) of the New York Convention provides that a court
"shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitra-
tion, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed." The question of
whether an agreement is "null and void" has been the most frequent
subject of litigation, although there has also been one case interpret-
44. See Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 660 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2005); Stan-
dard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 2003); Kahn
Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int'l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1999).
45. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666, 669 (5th
Cir. 1994).
46. See Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int'l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2008);
Regent Seven Seas, Nos. 06-22347-CIV, 06-22539-CIV 2007 WL 601992 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 21, 2007); Sarhank, 404 F.3d at 660; Kahn Lucas Lancaster, 186 F.3d 210.
47. G.A. Res. 61/33, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/33 (Dec. 18, 2006), available at http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/a61-33-e.pdf; UNCITRAL
Rep. on the work of its 39th Sess., June 19-July 6, 2006, U.N. GOAR, 61st Sess., Supp.
No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/61/17 at 61, available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UN-
DOC/GENV06/558/15/pdf/VO655815.pdfOpenElement [hereinafter 2006
UNCITRAL Recommendation].
48. Glencore Ltd. v. Degussa Engineered Carbons L.P., 848 F.Supp.2d 410
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that an exchange of emails going both ways was sufficient for
the "agreement in writing" requirement).
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ing whether an agreement was "incapable of being performed." To
date, no court in the United States has examined whether an agree-
ment is "inoperative" under the Convention.
Even when the underlying contract contains a specific choice of
law clause, courts will evaluate whether the arbitration clause is en-
forceable according to the law of the forum. In Freudensprung v.
Offshore Technical Services, Inc. ,49 for example, the court ruled that
American federal law applied despite the parties' choice of Texas law.
According to the Freudensprung court, the FAA preempted any con-
flicting state law contained in the choice of law provision. The court
referenced Matter of Ferrara S.p.A. 50 which explained:
In actions arising under Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (Act), questions concerning the enforceability of
arbitration agreements are governed by federal law, even
where the parties have by agreement specified the law gov-
erning the interpretation of the contract, and the place of
and/or tribunal for arbitration .... This result is consistent
in these cases with the view that enforceability of an agree-
ment to arbitrate relates to the law of remedies and is
therefore governed by the law of the forum.5 '
Under federal law then, the court in Freudensprung enforced the
agreement to arbitrate due to the United States policy establishing a
presumption of arbitrability.5 2
Apple & Eve, LLC v. Yantai N. Andre Juice Co. 5 3 involved par-
ties' potential waiver of an arbitration agreement and a
determination regarding whether such waiver made the agreement
"null and void." In this case, the defendants had actively attempted to
avoid arbitration until the last possible moment. The question was
whether the defendants had therefore impliedly waived their right to
arbitration. The arbitration clause specified the country of the defen-
dant-China-as the seat of the arbitration, but did not include a
choice of law provision. The Second Circuit used its own forum law to
determine whether the defendants had waived their right to arbitra-
tion. The Second Circuit had long held that arbitration agreements,
like other contract rights, could be modified or waived by the parties'
actions. As such, the court found that the defendants here had
waived their right to arbitration in China and therefore the agree-
49. Freudenspring v. Offshore Technical Serv., Inc., 379 F. 3d 327, n. 7 (5th Cir.
2004).
50. In re Ferrara S.p.A., 441 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
51. Id. at n. 2 (citations omitted).
52. Freudensprung, 379 F. 3d at 341.
53. Apple & Eve, LLC v. Yantai N. Andre Juice Co., 610 F. Supp. 2d 226 (E.D.N.Y
2009).
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ment was considered "null and void" under the Convention. The court
vacated an earlier order staying legal action pending arbitration.5 4
Some courts in the United States have found that an interna-
tional standard represents the law of the forum that will be used to
determine whether an arbitration clause is null and void. Specifi-
cally, in Bautistia v. Star Cruises,5 5 the court found that a contract
could be found null and void under the Convention only in situations
involving standard breach of contract claims "such as fraud, mistake,
duress, and waiver-that can be applied neutrally on an interna-
tional scale."5 6 Bautistia was first overturned, then later upheld by
subsequent cases in the 11th Circuit.5 7
In Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., Ltd.,5s the court dealt with
whether the arbitration clause was "incapable of being performed." In
the absence of a choice of law provision and in light of the interna-
tional nature of the agreement, the court concluded that the
Convention applied. The court determined that the law of New York
applied, and such law did not permit a liquidator who had been ap-
pointed to oversee an insolvency to participate in arbitration.
Therefore, the arbitration clause was "incapable of being per-
formed,"5 9  the claims were not "capable of settlement by
arbitration,"60 and the court could not compel arbitration. 6 1 The court
noted that the "practical result" was "to relieve the parties from hav-
ing to proceed through a futile arbitration in which the resulting
award would be unenforceable in New York because of the Supreme
Court's exclusive jurisdiction in liquidation matters."6 2
54. Id. at 234.
55. Bautistia v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005).
56. Id. at 1302 (quoting DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 202 F.3d 71, 80
(1st Cir.2000)) (refusing to find agreement null and void on unconscionability
grounds).
57. See Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2009) (refusing to
enforce arbitration agreement contained in a seamen employment contract because
while the NY Convention does apply, the affirmative defense of violation of public
policy permitted the court to not enforce the clause; here the court determined that
compelling foreign arbitration that would follow foreign law is adverse to the public
policy of the United States); Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir.
2011) (resolving the intra-circuit split generated by Thomas by following the reason-
ing in Bautistia and limiting the null and void affirmative defense to bases that would
be internationally recognized).
58. Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., Ltd., 77 N.Y.2d 225 (N.Y. 1990).
59. New York Convention, supra note 1, at Article II, 3.
60. New York Convention, supra note 1, at Article II, 1.
61. Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., Ltd., 77 N.Y.2d at 232-233.
62. Id. at 233.
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E. Waiver of the Right to Arbitrate
Like many other contractual obligations, the right to arbitrate is
waiveable.6 3 If a party has waived his or her right to arbitrate, the
party who would have been entitled to have a dispute resolved
through arbitration cannot later argue that the issue should have
been decided in that forum. The party who could have argued against
arbitration is in default.
A party is able to waive his or her right to arbitrate in two ways:
by expressly indicating a desire to resolve the relevant claims before
a United States court rather than through arbitration, or by engaging
in civil litigation so that the other party will be prejudiced if the case
is transferred to arbitration.6 4 A court may find prejudice-and
waiver of the right to arbitrate-if "the party seeking arbitration al-
lows the opposing party to undergo the types of litigation expenses
that arbitration was designed to alleviate."65 On the other hand, if
litigation is in its early stages, it is unlikely a court will find that
initiating a lawsuit is inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. 66
F. Lack of Knowledge that an Arbitration Clause Exists
Under United States law, an arbitration provision usually is up-
held and enforced even if the party disputing the clause asserts that
he or she did not read the clause.6 7 This is true even if the agreement
would not be enforceable in the nation of the disputing party, particu-
larly if the parties have chosen United States law to govern
arbitrable disputes.68 A party seeking to avoid enforcement of an ar-
bitration clause must make a showing sufficient to come within one of
the exceptions to the general rule that a person of ordinary under-
standing and competence is bound by the provisions of a contract he
signed regardless of whether or not he has read such provisions.6 9
63. See Cornell & Co., Inc. v. Barber & Ross Co., 360 F.2d 512, 513 (D.C.Cir.
1966); see also Apple & Eve, LLC v. Yantai N. Andre Juice Co., 610 F. Supp.2d 226,
228 (E.D.N.Y 2009).
64. Apple & Eve, LLC., 610 F. Supp.2d at 228.
65. Morewitz v. W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indemnity Assoc. (Luxem-
bourg), 62 F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995).
66. Hodgson v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1258 (S.D.
Fla. 2009).
67. In re Ferrara S. p. A., 441 F. Supp. 778, 781-782 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
68. Id.
69. Id at 782.
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IV. OBJECTIONS AND DEFENSES To THE ENFORCEMENT OF
ARBITRAL AWARDS
A. Distinguishing Between Vacatur and Refusal to Enforce
Arbitral Awards
Although the focus of this Article is on American courts' enforce-
ment or refusal to enforce arbitral awards, it is important to
distinguish these from vacatur. According to American courts, the
state in which an arbitral award is made has "primary" jurisdiction,
and a court located in that state is free to vacate, annul or set aside
an award in accordance with the state's domestic scheme of arbitral
law "and its full panoply of express and implied grounds of relief."7 0
Thus, if an arbitration occurred in the United States-or, in some
circumstances, under American law-American courts have primary
jurisdiction and may apply the FAA's grounds for vacatur.7 1
In contrast, if an arbitral award was rendered in a foreign state,
an American court has only "secondary" jurisdiction and may only
decide whether to enforce, or refuse to enforce, the arbitral award.
The court's review is then generally limited to the seven grounds pro-
vided in Article V of the New York Convention, infra.7 2
B. Choice of Procedural Law for Judicial Review of an Arbitral
Award
Procedural law governs the arbitration proceeding; substantive
law governs the interpretation of the underlying contract.7 3 Ameri-
can courts have found that an agreement specifying the place or seat
of the arbitration creates a strong presumption that the procedural
law of that state applies to the arbitration.7 4 A party who fails to
make the necessary showings will not be able to overcome such
presumption.7 5
Although it is possible for the seat of an arbitration to be in one
state while the proceedings will be held under the arbitration law of
70. Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim v. Toys "R" Us, 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997); see
Karaha Bodas Co., LLC v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Nne-
gara, 364 F. 3d 274, 287-88 (5th Cir. 2004); M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH, 87 F.3d
844, 849 (6th Cir. 1996).
71. See YusufAhmed, 126 F.3d at 21-23; Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndi-
cate, 618 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2010).
72. See YusufAhmed, 126 F.3d at 21-23; Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F. 3d at 287-88.
73. See M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH, 87 F.3d 844, 847-48 (6th Cir. 1996)
74. See Steel Corp. of the Philippines v. International Steel Services, Inc., 354
Fed. Appx. 689, 692-93 (3d Cir. 2009).
75. Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F. 3d at 287-88; See also Steel Corp. of the Philippines
v. Int'l Steel Services, Inc., 354 Fed.Appx. 689, 694-94 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that
contractual provision that "enforcement" would be governed by Philippine law, rather
than specific invocation of Philippine "procedural law," was insufficient to rebut the
strong presumption in favor of the application of the procedural law of the place of the
arbitration).
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another state, American courts have approvingly referenced authori-
ties describing this practice as "exceptional," "almost unknown," and
"a possibility that is more theoretical than real."7 6 American courts
have also discussed concerns regarding the complexity, inconve-
nience and challenges to forum neutrality created by requiring the
arbitral panel seated in one state to interpret and apply the procedu-
ral law of another state.7 7
Some American courts have been required to grapple with appli-
cation of the procedural law of individual American states rather
than a national procedural law. The Third Circuit has found that par-
ties may elect to be bound by individual American states' vacatur
standards, rather than those contained in the FAA, 7 because the
FAA requires the enforcement of parties' agreements to arbitrate and
does not bar the enforcement of state law rules. Importantly, how-
ever, "it is federal law that allows the parties to make and enforce
agreements that fall under the FAA or the Convention."7 9 The Third
Circuit conditioned parties' ability to elect state law vacatur stan-
dards upon the expression of clear and specific intent to be bound by
such standards.8 0
C. Defenses to Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, Generally
The FAA provides that if a court has jurisdiction under Chapter
2, the court "shall confirm" an arbitral award "unless it finds one of
the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of
the award specified in the said [New York] Convention."8 ' Article
V(1) of the Convention permits a court to refuse to recognize and en-
force an award if the protesting party furnishes proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in [A]rticle II
were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapac-
ity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which
the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was
made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not
given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of
76. See Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 291.
77. See id.
78. Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate, 618 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2010).
79. Id.; See also Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008)
("The FAA is not the only way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration
awards: they may contemplate enforcement under state statutory or common law, for
example, where judicial review of different scope is arguable").
80. See Ario, 618 F.3d at 290-95 (finding that when the arbitration provisions evi-
dences only the parties' intent to be bound by state law regarding the conduct of the
arbitration, the complaining party had not met its burden in demonstrating a clear
intent to use state law to determine enforcement of the arbitral award).
81. 9 U.S.C. §207 (2012).
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the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to pre-
sent his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or
not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration,
or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on
matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from
those not so submitted, that part of the award which con-
tains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance
with the law of the country where the arbitration took place;
or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or
has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award
was made. 2
In addition, Article V(2) permits a court to refuse to recognize
and enforce an arbitral award if it finds that "Itihe subject matter of
the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the
law of that country" or "[tihe recognition or enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the public policy of that country."8 3 American
courts have held that the complaining party bears a heavy burden to
prove that one of the Convention's seven defenses applies.
8 4
D. Inability to Present Case and Lack of Proper Notice
Article V(1)(b) of the Convention provides that a court may re-
fuse to enforce an arbitral award if "[tihe party against whom the
award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of
the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise una-
ble to present his case." 5 American courts have found that the FAA's
standards also apply in this context to the extent that they are "not in
conflict" with those in the Convention. 6 The FAA provides that a
court may vacate an arbitral award "where the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
82. New York Convention, supra note 1, at Art. V (1).
83. New York Convention, supra note 1, at Art. V (2).
84. See e.g., Telenor Mobile Commc'n v. Storm L.L.C., 584 F.3d 396, 405 (2d Cir.
2009).
85. New York Convention, supra note 1, at Article V(1)(b).
86. 9 U.S.C. §208 (2012); Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2007).
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material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced."8 7
Courts in the United States have recognized that the defenses of
lack of notice and inability to present the case essentially permit ap-
plication of the forum state's standards of due process and, indeed,
such due process rights are entitled to full force under the Conven-
tion. In the United States, the sources of such due process standards
are the Due Process Clauses contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which generally provide that the state (both national
and local) may not deprive a person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.
As American courts review arbitral awards, they cite frequently
to the seminal case of Mathews v. Eldridge"" for the general rule that
"the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be
heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'8 9 Inter-
estingly, and somewhat confusingly, they do not cite to the more
concrete three-part balancing test also established in Mathews for de-
termining whether a procedure sufficiently meets the guarantee of
procedural due process.90 American courts reviewing arbitral awards
instead tend to observe only that due process requires an arbitral
hearing to meet "'the minimal requirements of fairness'-adequate
notice, a hearing on the evidence, and an impartial decision by the
arbitrator."9 1
87. 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(3) (2012).
88. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). (in-
volving governmental deprivation of a citizen's benefits without first providing a pre-
termination in-person proceeding and finding that under the circumstances
presented, the citizen was not entitled to such pre-termination in-person proceeding);
see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (interpreting Due Process Clause to
require procedures to be tailored to "the capacities and circumstances of those who
are to be heard").
89. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18
(1976), (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14
L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)).
90. Id. at 335. This test requires a court to examine the significance of the private
interest that is subject to deprivation, the governmental interest in achieving its pub-
lic purposes effectively and efficiently through summary procedures, and the degree
of risk that such procedures could result in erroneous deprivation. United States
courts have regularly applied this test to determine the constitutionality of a wide
variety of procedures involving the deprivation of life, liberty or property, while also
recognizing that the right to due process does not require provision of the complete set
of procedural rights guaranteed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
91. Karaha Bodas Co., at 298-299 (quoting Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n,
244 F.3d 580, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) which was quoting Sunshine Mining Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 823 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987); Generica, 125 F.3d at 1130 (quot-
ing same). See also Iran Aircraft Industries v. AVCO Corporation, 980 F.2d 141 (2d
Cir. 1992), where the second circuit concluded that an arbitral panel had violated due
process when it met with one of the parties on an ex parte basis during a pre-hearing
conference, directed the party to submit audited summaries of invoice information
rather than the invoices themselves, and then ruled against the party for its failure to
submit invoices.
[Vol. 62
2014] ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 85
Issues raised under Article V(1)(b) generally involve the unavail-
ability of witnesses, the manner in which arbitrators heard offered
evidence, and notice. When a witness was unavailable for an arbitra-
tion hearing, American courts examine whether the witness was
essential, and whether the witness' testimony (or other evidence)
could have been offered in other forms. 92 Importantly, courts do not
require arbitrators to hear all of the evidence offered by parties. They
have noted that "the inability to produce one's witnesses before an
arbitral tribunal is a risk inherent in an agreement to submit to arbi-
tration" and that "by agreeing to arbitration, a party relinquishes his
courtroom rights, included that to subpoena witnesses."9 3 As a result,
American courts rarely refuse to enforce an arbitral award due to a
party's inability to present his case as he or she wished or due to
insufficient notice.9
4
E. Lack of Binding Effect upon the Parties
A court may refuse to enforce an arbitral award if it "has not yet
become binding upon the parties."95 The party seeking to avoid en-
forcement on this basis has the burden of proving that an award is
not binding. Courts similarly interpret the FAA to find a presumption
92. See, e.g. Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. v. Citigroup, No. 12 Civ. 283(GBD) 2013
WL789642, n. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16
(2nd Cir. 1997) (vacating district court's confirmation of arbitral award and remand-
ing for further consideration after finding that arbitral panel had refused to hear
testimony from one witness who could testify regarding facts that only he could
know); Karaha Bodas Co., LLC v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Nnegara, 364 F. 3d 274 (5th Cir. 2004); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v.
Societe Generale de L'Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974);
Sonera Holding, B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., No. 11 Civ. 8909 (DLC) 2012 WL
3925853 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Rive, S.A. v. Briggs of Cancun, Inc., 82 Fed. Appx. 359 (5th
Cir. 2003); Libanco v. Rep. of Turkey; Generica, Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics, Inc.,
125 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir. 1997).
93. See generally, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale
de L'Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Karaha
Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364
F.3d 274, 302 (5th Cir. 2004) (constitutional guarantee of procedural due process not
violated even though a witness' misleadingly non-committal answer to arbitrator's
question was found to be contradicted by later discovery of evidence that arbitral
panel refused to admit); but see Iran Aircraft Industries v. AVCO Corporation, 980
F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992) (arbitral panel violated due process when it met with one of
the parties on an ex parte basis during a pre-hearing conference, directed the party to
submit audited summaries of invoice information rather than invoices themselves,
and then ruled against the party for its failure to submit the invoices).
94. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, provides the
standard of notice, and courts generally find that notice meets this requirement. How-
ever, see Sea Hope Navigation Inc., v. Novel Commodities, S.A., No. 13 Civ. 3225 2013
WL 5695955 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2013), where the court denied a motion of default
judgment after the defendant asserted insufficient notice because it was notified via a
generic email address that was not actively monitored by the company.
95. New York Convention, supra note 1 at Article V, 1, e.
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that arbitral awards are binding.9 6 In order to win vacatur of an arbi-
tral award from a reviewing court, the FAA requires the party
contesting the award to bear the burden of proving that: ". . . the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter sub-
mitted was not made."97
Thus, in order to be reviewable, enforceable and not subject to
vacatur, the arbitral award must be both binding upon the parties
and "mutual, final, and definite." In determining reviewability,
American courts generally have focused on two of these require-
ments-finality and whether the award is binding.98
In applying these requirements to interim rulings, courts have
generally refused to rely on the captioning of the ruling.9 9 Rather,
courts examine the substance and effect of the interim award. Focus-
ing on the FAA's finality requirement for enforceability, courts often
analyze whether the ruling is "necessary to make the potential final
award meaningful." 100 Arbitrators' provisional awards designed to
secure the effectiveness of the arbitration process are final and thus
reviewable.' 0 ' In Pacific Reins. Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance
Corp.'0 2 for example, the court affirmed the lower court's confirma-
tion of an interim award establishing an escrow account, noting that
temporary equitable awards can be "essential to preserve the integ-
rity of that [the arbitral] process" 0 3 and necessary to preserve assets
or compel the performance that will make a final award meaning-
ful.10 4 Similarly, in Island Creek Coal Sales v. City of Gainesville,
96. See Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Rep. of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 910
(D.D.C. 1996); see also Europcar Italia v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 314 (2d
Cir. 1998) (examining the effect of Italian arbitrato irrituale and distinguishing an
award that is "binding on the parties" from an award that is "judicially binding").
97. 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(4) (West 2012).
98. See New United Motor Mfg., Inc. v. United Auto Workers Local, 617
F.Supp.2d 948, 954 (N.D.Cal. 2008) (citing ConnTech Dev. Co. v. Univ. of Conn. Educ.
Prop., Inc., 102 F.3d 677, 686 (2nd Cir.1996)); Millmen Local 550, United Broth. of
Carpenters and Joiners of Am., AFL-CIO v. Wells Exterior Trim, 828 F.2d 1373 (9th
Cir. 1987).
99. Publicis Commc'n v. True N. Commc'ns, Inc., 206 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir.2000);
see Pac. Reins. Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Rein. Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir.1991).
("finality should be judged by substance and effect, not by superficial technicalities.").
100. Publicis Commc'n v. True N. Commc'ns, Inc., 206 F.3d at 729; see also Yasuda
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Europe v. Continental Cas. Co., 37 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 1994),
Pac. Reins. Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Rein. Corp., 935 F.2d at 1023.
101. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d
926, 937 (N.D. Ca. 2003); Sojitz Corp. v. Prithvi Info. Solutions Ltd., 921 N.Y.S.2d 14
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (also referencing New York statute authorizing attachment to
permit securing finality of arbitral award).
102. Pacific Reins. Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 935 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir.
1991).
103. Id. at 1023 (but vacating the confirmation as to one party).
104. Id.
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Florida,10 the appellate court affirmed the district court's refusal to
vacate an interim award requiring specific performance of a contract
until the final award was determined, because such performance en-
sured that no further harm would come to the contractual
relationship if the award was upheld.'0 6 Courts have diverged in de-
termining whether interim arbitral orders permitting class
certification are sufficiently final to be subject to judicial review.' 0 7
In contrast, when courts' analysis of an arbitrator's intent
reveals that he did not intend an interim measure to be final or in-
tended it to be subject to modification, courts have found that the
award was not sufficiently final to be reviewable. In Chinmax Med.
Sys. Inc. v. Alere San Diego, Inc. ,108 for example, an "emergency arbi-
trator" had issued an order providing for temporary equitable relief
that required one of the parties to take certain actions within ten
days. The interim order also provided, however, that it was being is-
sued to facilitate consideration "'by the full panel of conservancy
.... "' and was subject to review by "the full arbitration tribunal, once
appointed, and thereafter as the tribunal may order."' Finally, the
rules of the arbitral organization explicitly provided for reconsidera-
tion, modification or vacatur of the interim award once the tribunal
was constituted.' 0 9 Under all of the circumstances presented, the
court concluded that the order was not final. In other contexts, when
an arbitrator has retained jurisdiction to make a later modification of
a substantive order, United States courts have similarly focused on
the arbitrator's intent to conclude that the order does not represent a
final award.1 0 Generally, when arbitrators make interim rulings
that do not resolve the merits of the claim submitted to them, judicial
review is exceptional."'
105. Island Creek Coal Sales v. City of Gainesville, Fla., 729 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir.
1984) (abrogated on other grounds, in Cortez Byrd Chips v. Bill Harbert Constr., 529
U.S. 193 (2000)).
106. Id. at 1049.
107. Compare Marron v. Snap-On Tools, Co., No. 03-4563, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
523 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 2006) with Genus Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jones, No. JFM-05-3028,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16933, at 4 (D. Md. April 6, 2006).
108. Chinmax Med. Sys. Inc. v. Alere San Diego, Inc.,10CV2467 WQH NLS, 2011
WL 2135350 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2011).
109. Id. at 5.
110. Orion Pictures Corp. v. Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc., 946 F.2d 722, 724 (9th
Cir.1991) (interpreting the Labor Management Relations Act rather than the FAA;
finality requires that arbitrator must intend the arbitration award to be a "complete
determination of every issue submitted").
111. Quixtar Inc. v. Brady, 2008 WL 5386774 at 13 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2008)
(quoting Michaels v. Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1980)).
Although there is no case law directly on point, it appears that advisory awards are
unlikely to be entitled to judicial review. See Hoffman La Roche v. Qiagen 730
F.Supp.2d 318, 328 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (reasoning that an arbitral award is entitled to
deference because, "an arbitration panel's conclusions are more than advisory opin-
ions for the federal courts-rather, they are thoughtful analyses made by adjudicators
steeped in the facts and law").
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F. Violation of Public Policy
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention provides that a court
may refuse to enforce an arbitral award "if the competent authority
in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds
that ... [t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be con-
trary to the public policy of that country."" 12
Due to the "general pro-enforcement bias informing the Conven-
tion" and international considerations of reciprocity, 1 3 American
courts have construed the public policy exception very narrowly. Spe-
cifically, courts have concluded that they should deny enforcement of
an award only when such enforcement would violate the United
States' "most basic notions of morality and justice[ ,]"" 4 be "repug-
nant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just""15 in the
United States, or "the contract as interpreted [by the arbitrators]
would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dom-
inant and is ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents
and not from general consideration of supposed public interests."" 6
The public policy exception also may preclude enforcement if the
arbitral award or arbitral agreement" 7 was fraudulently obtained.
This determination is distinct from the issue of whether the primary
agreement was forged or fraudulently induced. The latter determina-
tion is to be made by the arbitral panel and cannot be re-litigated
before the court during confirmation or enforcement proceedings." 8
Specifically, American courts have held that they may refuse enforce-
112. New York Convention, supra note 1 at Article V(2)(b).
113. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas v. Societe Generale De Lindustrie Du Papier
508 F.2d at 973-74.
114. See Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975); Rive v.
Briggs of Cancun, 82 Fed.Appx. 359, 364 (5th Cir. 2003); Karaha Bodas Co., LLC v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 306 (5th
cir. 2004); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas v. Societe Generale De Lindustrie Du
Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2nd Cir. 1974); Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C., Prof 1
Contract Adm'rs, Inc.v. Supreme Foodservice GmbH, 495 Fed.Appx. 149, 152 (2d Cir.
2012).
115. Rep. of Argentina v. GB Group PLC, 764 F. Supp.2d 21, 39 (D.C. 2011) (quot-
ing Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986) and Tahan v. Hodgson, 662
F.2d 862, 864 (D.C.Cir.1981)).
116. Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut. Marine Office, Inc., 344 F.3d 255, 264 (2d
Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987)); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766
(1983); Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte v. Indus. Risk Insurers,
141 F.3d 1434, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998); Rep. of Argentina v. GB Grp. PLC, 764 F.
Supp.2d at 31.
117. See China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334
F.3d 274, 289-90, n. 12 (3d Cir. 2003) (because one of the parties claimed forgery of
the signatures on the agreements containing arbitration clauses, Third Circuit va-
cated enforcement order of the district court and remanded for court to determine
whether parties had reached a valid agreement to arbitrate; the court specifically ex-
pressed no opinion regarding the applicability of Article V(2)(b)).
118. See Europcar Italia v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 1998).
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ment under the public policy exception if they find that the prevailing
party furnished perjured evidence to the arbitral tribunal or the
award was procured by fraud. 119
The language of Article V(2)(b) makes it clear that the exception
is meant to accommodate the public policy of the local forum in which
enforcement is sought, rather than international public policy.' 20 In a
country with a federalist governmental system such as the United
States, however, the language of the exception could invite use of ei-
ther national public policy, or public policy as determined by
individual states. American courts have generally required use of na-
tional public policy.' 2 ' Changzhou Amec Eastern Tools, however,
reveals the complex relationship between national and state law in
the United States. There, in the course of deciding whether Article
V(2)(b) permitted the refusal to enforce an arbitral award, the district
court found that national arbitration law required the application of
California contract law regarding the defense of duress. 2 2 Thus, in
that instance, the court found that national public policy incorpo-
rated the law of an individual state.
G. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
The New York Convention does not specifically list lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction as a valid defense to enforcement. Article III of the
Convention provides that contracting states shall recognize and en-
force arbitral awards "in accordance with the rules of procedure of the
territory where the award is relied upon[,]"123 and some commenta-
tors have suggested that the requirement of personal jurisdiction can
be understood to represent such a rule of procedure.' 24
119. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas
Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 306 (5th Cir. 2004).
120. Some commentators have derided this choice as "regrettable." See Hans Smit,
Comment on Public Policy in International Arbitration, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 65
(2002) (cited in Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Meets International Arbitration:
A Tribute to Hans Smit, 23 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 439, 447 (2012)).
121. Agility Public Warehousing Co. K.S.C., Professional Contract Administrators,
Inc. v. Supreme Foodservice GMBH, 495 Fed.Appx. 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012) (Second
Circuit found that the requirements of the Convention's public policy exception were
not met by a New York public policy requiring the dismissal of a plaintiffs claim if the
plaintiff (or a principal of the plaintiff corporation) invokes a privilege and refuses to
testify; here, employees had refused to testify after recent unsealing of indictment
against their employer).
122. Changzhou Amec E. Tools and Equip. Co. v. E. Tools & Equip., No. EDCV 11-
00354 VAP 2012 WL 3106620 at 13 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2012).
123. New York Convention, supra note 1 at Article III.
124. See Ank A. Santens, Difficulties Enforcing New York Convention Awards in
the U.S. Against Non-U.S. Defendants: Is the Culprit Jurisprudence on Jurisdiction,
the Three-Year Time Bar in the Federal Arbitration Act, or Both?, Kluwer Arbitration
Blog, (Dec. 23, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/12/23/difficulties-en-
forcing-new-york-convention-awards-in-the-us-against-non-us-defendants-is-the-
culprit-jurisprudence-on-jurisdiction-the-three-year-time-bar-in-the-federal-arbitra-
tion-act-or-bot/ (citing as analogous, but not endorsing, Monegasque de Reassurances
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In general, though, courts in the United States have not tended
to rely on the language of the Convention to permit examination of
personal jurisdiction. Rather, they have turned to the individual fo-
rum state's long-arm statute125  and the Due Process Clause
described supra. An American court's judgment is void if the court
lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and the defendant did
not waive this constitutional defense.
Obviously, courts may assert personal jurisdiction over a defen-
dant who is a citizen of the state in which the court is located ("forum
state") or over a defendant whose property is at issue and is located
in the forum state.126 It is also relatively straightforward that courts
in the United States may assert personal jurisdiction over a defen-
dant who was served with notice of process while in the forum
state 27 or has such significant and regular contacts with the forum
state that courts have "general jurisdiction" over him or her. 28 Thus,
personal jurisdiction generally will not be an issue in the enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards in the United States because the award
debtor is likely to be located in the forum state, served while in the
forum state, possess property in the forum state, or have very signifi-
cant and regular contacts with the forum state. American courts also
have been willing to find award debtors subject to personal jurisdic-
tion based on the contacts that their affiliates have with the forum
state,' 29 but it appears that the U.S. Supreme Court is narrowing
this basis for general jurisdiction.' 30
S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens was applicable as a "rule of procedure" under Article
III of the New York Convention); Aristides Diaz-Pedrosa, Shaffer's Footnote, 109 W.
VA. L. REV. 17, 24 (assuming that the due process jurisdictional requirement falls
within the local "rules of procedure" in Article III); also citing as contrary authority,
William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and National Law:
Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 251, 262 (Dec.
2006) (maintaining that such approach is not supported by the drafting history of the
New York Convention)).
125. See e.g., STX Pan Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd., Slip
Copy, 2013 WL 1385017 (S.D.N.Y.,2013) (examining a State of New York long arm
statute).
126. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
127. See Burnham v. Sup. Ct. Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
128. See e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); see also
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., et al. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011) (find-
ing that North Carolina could not assert general, or "all-purpose jurisdiction" over
defendants that were foreign companies).
129. See Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 895 F. Supp. 2d 513, 523
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) rev'd on other grounds, F.3d , 2014 WL 1645255 (2d Cir. 2014)
(reversing for lack of personal jurisdiction).
130. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014) (finding that defendant was
not subject to general jurisdiction in forum state based on its subsidiary's contacts);
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851, 2857 (2011)
(finding that foreign subsidiaries of American parent company did not have sufficient
contacts for specific or general jurisdiction in forum state, but also noting that the
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Personal jurisdiction becomes more problematic, however, when
neither the defendant nor his property is located in the forum state-
and this has occasionally been the case in the context of petitions to
enforce or confirm foreign arbitral awards in the United States.
Under these circumstances, it becomes more likely that it will be in-
convenient, expensive and unfair for the defendant to be required to
travel to the forum state to defend himself from potential depriva-
tion. As a result, at that point, courts in the United States must
determine whether the defendant has sufficient "minimum contacts"
with the forum state so that the court's assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion will not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."131
H. Forum Non Conveniens
In the United States, even if a court has personal jurisdiction, it
may decide as a matter of discretion that the case would be better
heard in another state's tribunals. The court will then dismiss the
case based on forum non conveniens. The forum non conveniens doc-
trine requires a three-step analysis. First, the court must determine
the degree of deference it will give to the petitioner's choice of forum.
Although the New York Convention specifically provides that courts
may not impose "substantially more onerous conditions" on the en-
forcement of foreign arbitral awards than on domestic awards, 13 2
some courts have explained explicitly that they extend less deference
to foreign petitioners' choice of a United States forum and use a slid-
ing scale to determine the precise degree of deference they will
apply. 1 33 Second, the court must consider whether the alternative fo-
rum proposed by the respondent is adequate to adjudicate the
dispute. An alternative forum is ordinarily adequate if the defend-
ants are amenable to service of process there and the forum permits
litigation of the subject matter of the dispute.' 3" The alternative fo-
respondents belatedly urged treatment of the parent and subsidiaries as a "single
enterprise" or "unitary business" and thus forfeited the contention).
131. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95
(1945); see First Investment Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuild-
ing, Limited, 703 F.3d 742, 746 (5th Cir. 2013) (relying on the Due Process Clause and
the potential for significant deprivation to affirm lower court's dismissal of an award
confirmation action for lack of personal jurisdiction when the award debtor was
neither present nor in possession of property in the United States).
132. See in re Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine,
311 F.3d 488, 495 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443
(1994)).
133. See id. at 498; Figueiredo Ferraz E. Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Rep. of
Peru, 665 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming "somewhat reduced deference"); see
also Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 895 F.Supp.2d 513, 523 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (regarding sliding scale), rev'd on other grounds, Sonera Holding B.V. v.
Cukurova Holding A.S., J.3d , 2014 WL 1645255 (2d Cir. 2014).
134. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.25 (1981).
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rum is not inadequate simply because it does not afford plaintiff the
identical causes of action or relief available in the plaintiffs chosen
forum. 1 35 Third, the court balances the public and private interests
implicated in the choice of forum. 13 6 The private factors focus on the
convenience of the litigants-e.g., the ease of access to evidence; the
availability of means to compel attendance by unwilling witnesses;
the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; the ability to
view premises if needed; and other practical problems that are rele-
vant to making the proceeding easy, expeditious and inexpensive for
the litigants.' 37 The public factors deal primarily with the adminis-
trative difficulties that the case may cause for the courts in the
United States-e.g., exacerbating current court congestion; imposing
jury duty upon citizens whose community has no relationship to the
litigation; the local interest in resolving local disputes; and the
problems of legal research and interpretation that can be implicated
when a United States court is required to apply foreign law.' 38
In general, a court will dismiss on the grounds of forum non con-
veniens only if the petitioner's choice of forum represents
inappropriate forum shopping, an alternative forum exists and has
jurisdiction to hear the matter, and proceeding in the chosen United
States forum "would establish ... oppressiveness and vexation to a
[respondent] out of all proportion to [the] [petitioner's] convenience,
or . . . the chosen forum is inappropriate because of considerations
affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems."' 3 9
As with the defense of personal jurisdiction, the Convention does
not specifically list forum non conveniens as a defense to the enforce-
ment of awards. In Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK
Naftogaz of Ukraine,' 40 however, the Second Circuit found that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens represented a "rule of procedure" as
described in Article III and, for this and other reasons, affirmed the
district court's dismissal of an enforcement action on the basis of fo-
rum non conveniens."4
135. Norex Petroleum, 416 F.3d. at 158.
136. Id. at 153.
137. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at n.6.
138. Id. In re Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine,
311 F.3d 488, 500. (In a seminal forum non conveniens case, the district court listed
the public factors as follows: "the administrative difficulties flowing from court con-
gestion; the 'local interest in having localized controversies decided at home;' the
interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law
that must govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of
laws, or in the application of foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in
an unrelated forum with jury duty."). Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6.
139. Cont'l Transfert Technique Limited v. Federal Government of Nigeria, 697
F.Supp.2d 46, 57 (D.C. 2010).
140. In re Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311
F.3d 488.
141. Id. at 501.
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The application of forum non conveniens has become rather
heated recently in the United States, especially since the decision in
Figueiredo v. Republic of Peru14 2 in which the court dismissed an ac-
tion to enforce an arbitral award on the basis of forum non
conveniens. In that case, Peru-which the court described as a devel-
oping country-had a statute placing a percentage cap on the amount
that it could be required to pay each year to arbitral award creditors.
The petitioner in Figueiredo acknowledged that it sought enforce-
ment and access to the Peru's assets in the United States as a means
to avoid the long wait for full payment that would be occasioned by
the cap. The court in Figueiredo found that Peru's financial concerns,
as expressed in its statute, should be considered a public interest and
factored into the third step of the forum non conveniens analysis. In a
very influential dissent, Judge Gerard E. Lynch urged that while
Peru's financial concerns might be relevant to a choice of law analy-
sis, they were not among the public factors to be considered in forum
non conveniens analysis. 14 3
Judge Lynch also noted that "because arbitrators have no power
to enforce their judgments, international arbitration is viable only if
the awards issued by arbitrators can be easily reduced to judgment in
one country or another and thereby enforced against the assets of the
losing party."' 4 4 The court in Sonera Holding v. Cukurova Hold-
ing,' 45 quoted Judge Lynch approvingly as it explained its decision to
refuse to dismiss an award enforcement case based on forum non con-
veniens."4 6 Indeed, the Sonera court went on to note that the courts of
New York have a public interest in "convincing the international bus-
iness community of the benefits of selecting New York law and a New
York forum in order to ensure fairness and predictability in their
commercial relationships." 47
The second Circuit recently vacated the Sonera Court's judg-
ment, reversing on personal jurisdiction grounds, and it is important
to note that courts in the United States appear to use forum non con-
veniens quite sparingly as a basis for refusing to entertain actions to
enforce arbitral awards. 148 Indeed, Sonera is a case in which the
award debtor had no assets in the United States and yet the district
court had refused to use the doctrine of forum non conveniens as a
basis for dismissal.' 49
142. Figueiredo, 665 F.3d 384.
143. Figueiredo, 665 F.3d at 407-08 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 395.
145. Sonera Holding, 895 F.Supp.2d 513.
146. Sonera Holding, 895 F.Supp.2d at 524.
147. Sonera Holding, 895 F.Supp.2d at 525.
148. TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 303-04
(D.C.Cir. 2005).
149. See e.g., Sonera Holding, 895 F.Supp.2d 513 (concluding that Sonera's failure
to identify U.S. assets does not establish a lack of a good-faith basis for seeking en-
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L Adjournment, Stay, Dismissal with and without Prejudice
A court's refusal to recognize or enforce an arbitral award is
likely to be deemed a dismissal with prejudice and thus would re-
present a decision on the merits that is entitled to preclusive
effect. 15 0
Rather than refuse to recognize or enforce an arbitral award, a
court may under certain circumstances "adjourn the decision on the
enforcement" of an arbitral award under Article VI of the Convention:
If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the
award has been made to a competent authority referred to in
article V(1)(e), the authority before which the award is
sought to be relied upon may, if it considers it proper, ad-
journ the decision on the enforcement of the award ... 1
Adjournment can be understood to constitute either a "stay" or a
dismissal without prejudice.' 5 2 If adjournment is understood as a
stay, this decision permits the court to maintain some form of control
over the enforcement proceeding even as it postpones decision-mak-
ing. Dismissal without prejudice, in contrast, does not permit the
court to maintain any control over the proceeding. Rather, this deci-
sion simply permits the petitioner to return to court in the future
with the same request for recognition and enforcement.
The alternative of adjournment is most appropriate when a com-
peting foreign action has been brought, especially in the originating
country. On one hand, United States courts favor the prompt enforce-
ment of arbitral awards, and adjournment represents delay. On the
other hand, if the parallel proceeding is occurring in the originating
country and it is possible that the award will be set aside, a United
States court may be "acting improvidently"' 5 3 if it proceeds with en-
forcement. 5 4 Either a stay or a dismissal without prejudice permits a
forcement in the U.S. and observing that Cukurova may acquire property in the U.S.,
and Sonera will have a "judgment in hand").
150. See Telcordia Tech Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., 458 F.3d 172, 179 (3d Cir. 2006).
151. New York Convention, supra note 1, at Article VI.
152. See Telecordia Tech Inc., 458 F.3d at 180.
153. Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir.
1998).
154. The D.C. Circuit has approvingly cited to the Second Circuit's development of
a list of six factors to be weighed by a district court to determine whether adjourn-
ment is the appropriate course of action:
(1) the general objectives of arbitration-the expeditious resolution of disputes
and the avoidance of protracted and expensive litigation; (2) the status of the
foreign proceedings and the estimated time for those proceedings to be re-
solved; (3) whether the award sought to be enforced will receive greater
scrutiny in the foreign proceedings under a less deferential standard of re-
view; (4) the characteristics of the foreign proceedings, including (i) whether
they were brought to enforce an award (which would tend to weigh in favor of
a stay) or to set the award aside (which would tend to weigh in favor of en-
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United States court to express "comity in the international arena,"
especially if there are competing actions pending in the United States
and elsewhere. 15 5
forcement); (ii) whether they were initiated before the underlying
enforcement proceeding so as to raise concerns of international comity; (iii)
whether they were initiated by the party now seeking to enforce the award in
federal court; and (iv) whether they were initiated under circumstances indi-
cating an intent to hinder or delay resolution of the dispute; (5) a balance of
the possible hardships to each of the parties ... ; and (6) any other [relevant]
circumstances ....
Cont'l Transfert v. Fed. Gov't of Nigeria, 697 F.Supp.2d 46, 60 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting
Europear, 156 F.3d 310 at 317-16).
155. Telecordia Tech Inc., 458 F.3d at 181 (suggesting this as a benefit of dismissal
without prejudice and citing to Stonington Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie
Speech Prod. N.V., 310 F.3d 118, 126 (3d Cir. 2002).
